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In the opening chapters of his magisterial study, The Concept of Law,
H. L. A. Hart emphatically rejects John Austin's view that the essence of
the law is a "situation where one person gives another an order backed by
threats" and thereby "obliges him to comply."' Hart objects that this view
fails to distinguish the law and its operations from the action of a gunman
who "orders his victim to hand over his purse, and threatens to shoot him
if he refuses." 2 It is simply counter-intuitive, he contends, to assimilate law
to this reductive paradigm, and indeed, "Mere temporary ascendancy of
one person over another is naturally thought of as the polar opposite of
law, with its relatively enduring and settled characters." "In most legal
systems," he adds, "to exercise such short term coercive power as the
gunman has would constitute a criminal offense." '3 "Coercive power" is
the key phrase here for it identifies what is for Hart the important distinction
between what the law is and what the gunman does. Rather than coercing
individuals by the exercise of mere force, the law binds members of society
to a rule or set of rules that has the character of being general and impartial,
that is, no respecter of persons. Without "the idea of a rule," Hart declares,
''we cannot hope to elucidate even the most elementary forms of law.'' 4
Of course, as Hart himself sees, the notion of a rule does not entirely
eliminate coercion, since where there is a rule of law there is necessarily
some form of constraint in relation to which "human conduct is made in
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2. Id.
3. Id. at 24.
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some sense nonoptional or obligatory." ' 5 The phrase "in some sense"
identifies the difference Hart would like to establish between legal obligation
and the model of the gunman; while the individual under the law is not
wholly free-such freedom would be incompatible with the very idea of
law-the obligations to which he is subject are not merely the effect of
arbitrary power but of a power that is enabled by an independent and
authoritative source. That source is the rule of law which, Hart says,
operates by "conferring powers . . . on persons qualified in certain ways
to legislate by complying with a certain procedure. ' ' 6 Notice how much
distance there is in this account between the source of power and the object
of its exercise. In the gunman scenario, the coercion is direct and discrete;
in the world of rule the coercing agent stands at the end of a long and
articulated chain, beginning with the rule itself. The rule mandates not an
act but a procedure which itself can only be put in motion by persons who
meet prestipulated and abstract qualifications (age, education, skills, etc.),
and these persons authorize still other persons who must themselves satisfy
additional formal requirements. It is from this chain and not from any
temporarily ascendant outlaw that the pressure of obligation issues, and the
obedience that then follows, if it follows, will be the result not of force
and violence, but of a principled process.
Or so it might seem. Could it not be said that procedure rather than
doing away with force merely masks it by attenuating it, by placing it
behind a screen or series of screens? After all, the crucial question, which
returns the original problem to center stage, still has to be asked: Who gets
to make the rules? And once that question is answered, another question
(it is really the same) waits behind it: Who gets to say who gets to make
the rules? If the answer to these questions turns out to be something like
"whoever seizes the opportunity and makes it stick," then there is finally
little to distinguish the rule centered legal system from the actions of the
gunman; this gunman is merely better camouflaged. It is precisely such a
danger that Hart spies when, later in the book, he identifies and considers
another and more subtle form of imposition and coercion, that exercised
by a court when, under the cover of its responsibility to interpret law, it
instead makes law, and thereby demonstrates the truth of Bishop Hoadley's
famous observation: "whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any
written or spoken laws, it is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and
purposes and not the person who first wrote or spake them." ' 7 As Hart
notes, this is simply an older version of what is to us a familiar claim:
"The law (or the constitution) is what the courts say it is." 8 If this is indeed
the case, then the rule of law or, more precisely, the law of rule, becomes
an illusion, for the rule as a constraint, as a safeguard against casual

5. Id. at
6. Id. at
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violence, falls to the daily acts of violence committed by judges who call
the tune as they happen to see (and desire) it. Here is a "temporary"
ascendancy of one person not only over another, but over many; here is a
forceful capture even more sinister than that performed by the gunman
because it wears the face of legitimate authority.
The great merit of Hart's analysis is that it makes clear the close
relationship-a relationship so close as to be one of identity-between the
threat posed to law by force and the threat posed to law by interpretation.
If it is the business of law to protect the individual from coercion that is
random, unpredictable, and arbitrary, then the individual, is no less at risk
when he is at the mercy of an interpreting court than when he is at the
mercy of an armed assailant. In both cases he is nakedly exposed to an
agent who has seized authority and is in the accidental circumstance of
being able to get away with it. Of course, there is the difference that in
one case a legislature (sometimes democratically elected) intervenes between
the would-be coercer and his victim, but that is cold comfort if Bishop
Hoadley is right and the interpreter "is he who is the lawgiver to all intents
and purposes." If the gunman is the paradigmatic instance of force outside
the law, interpretation is the force that resides within the law, and like the
gunman it must be regulated and policed lest it subvert the law's claim to
enact the dictates of general principles of justice and equity. It is crucial
that the law not issue from anyone in particular-even from a justice of
the Supreme Court-but from an impersonal source that resists the encroaching desires of particular (interpretive) wills. The Concept of Law is
an extended search for such a point of resistance, and after having failed
to discover it in the writings of his predecessors, Hart announces that he
has found it in "the idea of a rule," 9 and more particularly in the idea of
a "determinate rule" in which, he says, "the life of the law consists."' 10
Determinate rules, in contrast to vague or general rules that allow "the
applications of variable standards, do not require from officials and individuals a fresh judgment from case to case."" Indeed, it would be more
accurate to say that determinate rules (assuming for the moment that such
exist) do not permit a fresh judgment from case to case because they are
so directing as to leave no room in which the judgment might operate.
Determinate, in short, means settled, complete in and of itself, and therefore
in no need of further elaboration or addition. Determinate rules perform
as barriers or walls on which is written "beyond this point interpretation
cannot go. "
Given that in Hart's view Law is all that stands between us and "the
free use of violence,' ' '2 and given too that for him Law is thinkable only
in terms of determinate rules, it is hardly surprising that he equates the

9. Id. at 78.
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id. (emphasis in original).

12. Id.at 167.
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absence of such rules with the advent of chaos. "If it were not possible to
communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals
could understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain
conduct when occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could
exist."1' 3 This single sentence is at once a compendium and an explication
of the fears and desires that inform the tradition in which Hart writes;
there must be a mode of communication that is general, not tied to the
linguistic system of any particular community. Once produced, these general
communications must be understandable by anyone, no matter what his
individual educational or cultural experience. Indeed this understanding must
be so immediate as not to be in need of any further elaboration; in fact its
self-sufficiency shall be so perfect that elaboration or direction-otherwise
known as interpretation-will constitute an impiety. The content of this
unavoidable and self-sufficient understanding will be a set of matching
orders. The hearer or reader will be "required" that is, compelled, left
without choice, deprived of any opportunity to exercise his creative ingenuity. Unless all of this is the case, unless the framing of such general
standards in a fail-safe interpretation-proof mode is a possible achievement,
there will be no law.
The point is made even more dramatically by the court in Cargill
Commission Co. v. Swartwood 4 when it refuses to take into consideration
a prior oral agreement entered into by parties who subsequently executed a
written contract. In the course of its decision the court invokes the so called
"parol evidence rule" which states that when a written instrument is the
complete and final expression of the contracting parties, it cannot be varied
or contradicted by oral testimony. Obviously the intention of the rule is to
keep the writing-the palpable evidence of a binding agreement- authoritative by declaring it off-bounds to interpretation. The alternative is so
dreadful that the Cargill court can only contemplate it in the act of
dismissing it:
Were it otherwise, written contracts would be enforced not according
to the plain effect of their language, but pursuant to the story of
their negotiations as told by the litigant having at the time being
the greater power of persuading the trier of fact. So far as contracts
are concerned the rule of law would give way to the mere notions
of man at to who should win law suits .... Without [the parol
evidence] rule there would be no assurance of the enforceability of
a written contract. If such assurance were removed today from our
law, general disaster would result ....15
It takes one hundred and forty pages for Hart to move from the
rejection of force to the identification of force, and its potentially disastrous

13. Id. at 121
14. 159 Minn. 1, 198 N.W. 536 (1924).
15. Cargill Comm'n Co. v. Swartwood, 159 Minn I,

-,

198 N.W. 536, 538 (1924).
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consequences, with interpretation. The court in Cargill does it in only four
sentences, and in steps that can serve as a paradigm for the formalist
argument. The "plain effect" of contractual language is opposed to the
shifting and variable effects produced by stories powerfully-that is, forcefully-told. On the one hand, we have a stable and fixed (authoritative)
shape; on the other, we have the many shapes brought into being by the
exercise of verbal ingenuity. On the one side, we have the independent
power of self-construing language; on the other, we have the power generated by the artful distortions of interested agents. If the power of interest
is allowed to obscure matters of fact, if the determination of fact turns
into a contest of persuasive styles, then the notion of a contract-of an
agreement sealed by its verbal representation-goes by the boards; and if
that happens, general disaster-the wholesale breakdown of communicative
certainty and trust-cannot be far behind.
What the Cargill opinion makes clear is that in the court's view, as in
Hart's, the foundations of Law are linguistic. The safeguards the law erects
in order to repel the depredations of force are made of language, and if
they are to perform as safeguards, they must be made of a certain kind of
language, language that is capable of making what Hart calls an "authoritative mark.' 6 An authoritative mark is a mark that commands the field
in which it operates; it is a mark so complete and self-sufficient in its
declaration that no one could mistake it or misread it. An authoritative
mark is a determinate mark, and because it is possible to produce such a
mark, it is possible to fashion determinate rules, and finally to elaborate a
genuine system of law. So long as determinate rules embodied in authoritative marks are available as something to which we can have recourse in
the event of disputes, we have "in embryonic form
the idea of a legal
' 7
system," "the germ of the idea of legal validity.'
Some of you will have recognized in the vocabulary of "authoritative
marks" and "determinate rules" a familiar theory of language. In that
theory communication is anchored by something variously called literal
language, neutral language, objective language, explicit language, etc. By
any name what is referred to is a level of language immune from contextual
variation and therefore resistant to interpretation. The problem with this
theory is well known: it seems undermined by the variety that is so obviously
a feature of interpretive performance; nothing is more common than disputes
concerning the meaning of supposedly plain or literal language. In the face
of these disputes, in what sense could anything made of language be
"determinate"? Hart answers this question by dividing language into two
zones; there is at its center a "core of settled meaning" and at its outer
edges or "penumbra" a realm of uncertainty and doubt. Disagreements
arise in tha area of the penumbra where a certain looseness and vagueness
results in that he calls "open texture,""' but disagreements must themselves
16. HART, supra note 1, at 93.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 120.
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have a point of reference-something one is disagreeing about-and that
point of reference is given by the settled core which determines the parameters of any dispute that might occur. Interpreters are thus constrained
by the core even as they move with (relative) freedom in the area of the
penumbra, and it is because of this "duality of a core of certainty and a
penumbra of doubt ' ' 9 that communication is able to occur. "If we are to
communicate with each other at all ... then the ... words we use ...
must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its
application. ' 20 For then, "when we ... frame some general rule ... the
language ... fixes necessary conditions which anything must satisfy it if is
to be within its scope, and certain clear examples of what is certainly within
'2
its scope may be present to our minds." '
The passage then is from words with a core of settled meaning to rules
with a core of settled meaning, and later, as we shall see to historical bodies
of material (decisions, statutes) whose significance is no less settled. Hart
acknowledged that at every level variety and difference exist at the fringe"nothing can eliminate this.. .penumbra of doubt"-but he insists that the
variety is finally controlled and contained by a stability at the center, by
the "core," the "germ," the "embryon." By using these words to characterize that which stands between us and the advance of unconstrained
interpretation, Hart (inadvertently) alerts us to its fragility. In each of these
spatial metaphors, the still unmoving point (core, center, germ, embryon)
is surrounded by a much larger area (of fringe, penumbra, open texture),
and the impression is of an insurgent force always on the verge of overrunning the fortress at the center, of blurring the line that demarcates the
variable from the constant, of erasing (by writing over) the authoritative
mark. It is Hart's strategy repeatedly to assure us (and himself) that the
encroachment of interpretative will can be resisted if only we cling to the
"core," but it is a strategy of desperation, and at times Hart himself seems
more than half aware that it has already failed.
The sequence is always the same: he offers a candidate that will fill the
position of "authoritative mark"-of something so self-sufficiently clear
that it compels agreement and precludes interpretation-but then he so
qualifies the status of the "mark" that its authority is put seriously in
question. We see this first in his discussion of what he calls "primary rules
of obligation" (where primary, of course, is another world like center,
embryon, core), rules that place "restrictions on the free use of violence,
theft, and deception to which human beings are tempted but which they
must, in general, repress, if they are to coexist in close proximity with one
another." 22 As they first emerge, these rules are "unofficial"; that is, they

19. Id. at
20. Hart,
607 (1958).
21. HART,
22. Id. at

119.
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. RaEV., 593,
supra note 1, at 125.
89.
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stem from a shared desire for peace and security rather than from any
developed and codified legal apparatus. But even as they are introduced,
the primary rules are found to be inadequate, for it is only in a "small
community closely knit by ties of kinship, common sentiment and belief"
that they could function successfully. As soon as numbers increase and
beliefs diverge-one suspect that the trouble begins when the number reaches
two-there will arise "doubts... as to what the rules are or as to the precise
scope of some given rule." In the absence of an "authoritative text" or of
"an official whose declarations... are authoritative" there "will be no
procedure for settling. . .doubt." 23 At a very early stage then a regime of
primary rules will be characterized by "uncertainty" and when that happens
the rules "will require supplementation."
But if the rules are uncertain and require supplementation, how can
they be rules? Hart's project would seem to be compromised even before
it gets under way. The entire poini of rules, after all, is to stand alone and
provide a center (core, germ, embryon) to which all parties can turn in the
event of disputes. If the rules are incomplete, if one cannot know even
what they are without the aid of some supplementary elaboration, then
rather than constraining interpretation, the rules-so called-provoke it.
Hart, however, is not without resources, and he moves to anticipate just
such an objection by introducing a new line of defense in the form of a
set of "secondary rules," which, he says, will provide a "remedy" for the
"defects" of the primary rules. Chief among these is the "rule of recognition," a "rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules," a rule
that will provide an "affirmative indication" as to whether or not a primary
rule put forward by some interest is, in fact, "a rule of the group." 24 In
order to perform this function, a rule of recognition must be of "a different
kind"' 2 than other rules of the system, and much of Hart's discussion is
an attempt to specify the difference. He finds it first in the fact that this
rule is "inscribed, written down in a list" or "carved on some public
monument," but he realizes at once that the fact of the inscription will not
be sufficiently distinguishing, since writings can proliferate just as easily as
oral sayings or undeclared beliefs. The "crucial step," he declares, is "the26
acknowledgment of reference to the writing or inscription as authoritative,and this happens when the rule of recognition has been "accepted." 27 But
the notions of "acknowledgment" and "acceptance" are obviously and
with the requirement that the rule be "ultimate" and
fatally at odds
"supreme," 28 for a rule that depends on the acknowledgment and acceptance
of those who are to be bound by it can fail in both respects. It could
remain unacknowledged-go unrecognized-andit could be refused, perhaps
23. Id. at 90.
24. Id. at 92.
25. Id.

26. Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 97, 105.
28. Id. at 102, 103.
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in favor of other candidates. In order to be a rule of recognition in the
strong sense-and that is the only sense that will do the job-the rule must
be capable of recognizing or announcing itself and it must compel rather
than await acceptance. How can a rule be "a supreme criterion of validity" 29
if its own validity can either go unnoticed or become a matter of dispute?
The same difficulty attends Hart's second attempt to claim for the rule
of recognition a special, privileged status. Here the claim is that the rule
exists "on a different level" 30 from the other rules and from the system
whose center or core it is. It is in the nature of the rule, says Hart, that
when confronted by it, "we are brought to a stop in inquiries concerning
validity: for we have reached a rule which... provided criteria for the
assessment of the validity of other rules; but it is also unlike them in that
there is no rule providing criteria for the assessment of its own legal
validity." ' 3' Where other rules must "satisfy criteria" in order to be validated, "no such question can arise as to the validity of the very rule... which
provides the criteria." ' 32 But the question has already arisen as soon as
acknowledgment and acceptance have been made the criteria for identifying
the rule of recognition; for these criteria bring with them precisely what the
rule of recognition supposedly eliminates, an area of choice, and choice in
turn brings with it the spectres of dispute, doubt and uncertainty, earlier
named as the defects of the primary rules, defects which were to have been
remedied by the rule of recognition. If that rule can itself go unrecognized
or be refused, it is not the end, but the beginning of inquiry and we are
no better off than we were before.
Throughout this section of his argument Hart knows that he must firmly
demarcate the rule of recognition from the field it must regulate; it cannot,
in other words, be a mere item in that field, but must precede it. Indeed,
says Hart, "Even if it were enacted by statute, this would not reduce it to
the level of statute; for the legal status of such an enactment necessarily
would depend on the fact that the rule existed antecedently to and independently of the enactment. ' ' 33 The very "assertion that it exists can only
be an external matter of fact." '34 That is, its existence is not a matter of
inference or interpretation; it is, and must be, self-evident, immediately
perspicuous. It "escapes the conventional categories used for describing a
legal system, though these are often taken to be exhaustive. ' '3 But even as
he asserts the independence and perspicuity of the rule, Hart gives a
disturbing answer to the question of how it is to be identified. Given what
is required of this rule, it is a question that should not even be asked, for
to ask it is to deprive the rule of the adjectives "supreme" and "ultimate"

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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and to yield the supremacy to the agency contained in the answer. In this
case the answer is, to say the least, surprising. If the identification of the
rule or recognition "were doubted" (and even to admit this possibility is
to lose the game), "it could be established," Hart says, "by reference to
actual practice: to the way in which courts identify what is to count as
law .... "6 But surely this is to put the cart before the horse: Hart's entire
argument depends on a rule that stands apart from the field of practice, a
rule to which practitioners can turn when they are in doubt as to what to
do, and a rule to which arbitrators can turn when different practitioners
want to do different things. If, however, one can know the rule only by
extrapolating from practice, then practice rather than being generated or
tested by the rule is the source of the rule; and insofar as practice is itself
unsettled-not at all points uniform and stable-there will not one but
many rules and no independent mechanism for deciding between them.
Once the rule of recognition recedes into practice it becomes not a matter
of fact, but of interpretation, and the way is open to exactly the situation
Hart hopes to avoid, the situation in which the law is what the courts say
it is. For if one locates the rule by looking "to the way in which courts
identify" it, then the actions of the court come first and rule second. In
short, the rule of recognition is secondary in a sense much stronger than
Hart intends; it is belated in relation to the activity it purports to govern,
and that activity, rather than being constrained by the rule, makes and
unmakes it in response to the opportunities afforded by power and occasion.
By "that activity" I mean, of course, interpretation, and the failure of
the rule of recognition prompts me to formulate a rule of my own: Whatever
is invoked as a constraint on interpretation will turn out upon further
examination to have been the product of interpretation, or to put it in
Hart's terms, although it is always possible to distinguish a settled core
form the area of open texture that surrounds it, that core has itself been
formed by the very forces it supposedly repels. While the distinction between
core and penumbra can always be made at a particular moment, at another
moment the interpretive conditions within which the distinction is perspicuous can be challenged and dislodged; if that happens the distinction will
not so much disappear as it will take on a new historical form, one that is
no less precariously in place than its predecessor. The point is one Hart
makes himself when he observes that "canons of interpretation"-verbal
directions designed to restrict interpretation's scope-"make use of general
terms which themselves require interpretation; ' 37 and once one sees this,
one sees too that attaching canons to the canons-putting restrictions on
the formulation of restrictions-will not remedy but merely extend the
difficulty. No matter how many or what kinds of rules one promulgates,
the scope of interpretation will not have been the least whit diminished; for
each new attempt to control it will be the occasion for its exercise.

36. Id. at 105.
37. Id. at 123.
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Although Hart both sees and says this, he cannot quite grasp its
implications, for he continues to believe that the inability of rules to
constrain is only partial and that at the very least they serve to narrow the
area in which interpretation can operate. Hart's argument is that a rule
framed in the appropriately general terms (e.g., "vehicles are prevented
from entering the park") will pick out "standard instances" of its application, and that these instances will constitute a set of "central" or "plain
cases" in relation to which other, less clear, cases, can be classified. Thus
someone "faced with the question whether the rule prohibiting the use of
vehicles in the park is applicable to some combination of circumstances in
which it appears indeterminate," can proceed by considering "as one does
who makes use of a precedent, whether the present case resembles the plain
case "sufficiently" in "relevant respects. 38 The words "sufficiently" and
"relevant" indicate Hart's awareness that the agent's discretion remains
wide, but still it is a bounded area, marked off by a plain case that at once
gives interpretation a direction and holds it in check.
As an account of what people do (line up present cases with clear,
paradigm cases) this is impeccable, but as I read it, it is an account not of
interpretation subdued, but of interpretation triumphant. The question is
not whether there are in fact plain cases-there surely are-but, rather, of
what is their plainness a condition and a property? Hart's answer must be
that a plain case is inherently plain, plain in and of itself, plain independently
of the interpretive activities it can then be said to direct. But it takes only
a little reflection to see that the truth is exactly the reverse. A plain case is
a case that was once argued; that is, its configurations were once in dispute;
at a certain point one characterization of its meaning and significance-of
its rule-was found to be more persuasive than its rivals. At that point the
case became settled, became perspicuous, became undoubted, became plain.
Plainness, in short, is not a property of the case itself-there is no case
itself-but of an interpretive history in the course of which one interpretive
agenda-complete with stipulative definitions, assumed distinctions, canons
of evidence, etc.-has subdued another. That history is then closed, but it
can always be reopened. That is, on some later occasion, the settled
assumptions within which the case acquired its plain meaning can become
unsettled, can become the object of debate rather than the in place background in the context of which debate occurs; and when that happens,
contending arguments or interpretive agendas will once again vie in the field
until one of them is regnant and the case acquires a new settled and plain
meaning. So that while there will always be paradigmatically plain casesHart is absolutely right to put them at the center of the adjudicative
process-far from providing a stay against the force of interpretation, they
will be precisely the result of interpretation's force, for they will have been
written and rewritten by interpretive efforts.

38. Id. at 124.
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Another name for this process is precedent. Hart thinks of precedent
as a means of controlling an indeterminate present by reference to an
already determined (and therefore determining) past. To quote again the
key sentence, the agent who must decide considers "whether the present
case resembles the plain case 'sufficiently' in 'relevant' respects." The
question that is here elided is what does the plain case resemble; what is it
like? Hart's answer, which he gives by not giving it, is that the plain case
resembles itself, establishes its own configurations in relation to which later
cases are either like or unlike it. But resemblance and its opposite-that is,
sameness and difference-are not immanent in the object but emerge from
the perspective of the differential criteria that inform perception. If I see
two poems or two cases as similar, it will be because of the categories (of
size, or period, or theme... ) within which I search; were I to search within
different categories (of sameness and difference), the relationship between
the two poems or cases would be seen differently. Moreover, since each is
known in terms of the relationship between them, the poems and cases
would be different depending on the different categories of difference within
which they are seen. What this means is that resemblance (or difference) is
always a constructed (i.e. interpretive) phenomenon and therefore it can
always be constructed again. In fact, that is what happens in the citing of
precedents; the so-called plain case doesn't sit still, silently measuring the
distance or closeness between it and the present case. Indeed the demands
are made from either direction, for it is the interests and concerns of the
present case that generate the pressure for comparison and dictate its terms;
and it is in the light of the interests and concerns flowing from the present
case that the "plain case" will then be constituted.
As a result, when the plainness of the settled case is characterized, the
very terms of the characterization will have been set by the case that has
yet to be settled; rather than the past controlling the present, the present
controls the past by providing the perspective from which the two must be
brought into line. The truth about precedent then is the opposite of the
story we tell about it; precedent is the process by which the past gets
produced by the present so that it can then be cited as the producer of the
present. It is in this way that the law achieves what Ronald Dworkin calls
"articulate consistency," 3 9 a way of thinking and talking about itself which
creates and re-creates the continuity that is so crucial to its largest claim,
the claim to have an unchanging center that founds its authority. Articulate
consistency is not a fact, but an achievement, something that is forever
being wrested out of diverse materials which are then retroactively declared
always to have had its shape. The court in Cargill fears that if the parol
evidence rule is disregarded, the rule of law would give way to the power
of those who are able to tell the most persuasive story; but that is already
the whole of the law, whose collective story is continually being made up
and then told both to the lay public and to the agents in the legal system,

39. R. Dwomw, Hard Cases, in TAKINo RiHTs SERIOUSLY 88 (1977).
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i.e., to the tellers. Again Hart himself admits as much when he discusses
the ways in which courts can slip out of the net of precedent; the chief
way is to "distinguish" the earlier case, to find that the scope of its rule
is narrower than the concerns of the present case which can then be decided
independently of it. All you have to do, Hart explains, is to think up "some
legally relevant difference" between the two cases, and moreover, he adds,
"the class of such differences can never be exhaustively determined." That
is to say, the finding of difference is for all intents and purposes an
unconstrained activity, an activity which once know no natural stopping
point, an activity that cannot be stopped. Yet even though Hart makes this
point he fails to see how fatal it is to his general project, and continues
blithely on, asserting that "not withstanding these. . .forms of legislative
activity" 4 courts are bound by a "vast number ' 41 of determinate rules.
But his own analysis tells us that the rules are determinate only to the
extent that interpreters desire them to be; if the desires of interpreters
change, they will always be able to give those rules a new shape and then
to declare them determinate even as they are in the process of determining
them.
At one point Hart comes very close to saying as much. He is discussing
those situations in which it appears that courts are "exercising creative
powers which settle the ultimate criteria by which the validity of the very
42
laws, which confer upon them jurisdiction as judges, must itself be tested.
That is, at times courts seem to be themselves constituting the authority
(the rule of recognition) they subsequently cite as legitimizing their actions.
(Just this account has often been given of the American practice of judicial
review.) It may be the case, says Hart, that "when courts settle previously
unenvisaged questions concerning the most fundamental constitutional rules,
they get their authority to decide them accepted after the questions have
arisen and the decision has been given." '43 In short, it may be, as I put it
at the beginning of this chapter, that authority rests with whoever seizes an
opportunity to act and then makes the action stick, that, as Hart observes,
"all succeeds is success.' 44 This is a remarkable statement which is perfectly
congruent with my argument not for the denial of "cores" and "centers"
and "authoritative marks," but for their status as historical constructions
that are in place only so long as a more powerful construction has not yet
dislodged them. But even as he moves toward this position Hart pushes it
away by once again invoking the distinction between the settled core and
the fringe area of doubt as if it were unproblematical. "[N]ot every rule,"
Hart points out (correctly), "is open to doubt on all points," and, he adds,
"[T]he possibility of courts having authority at any given time to decide
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these limiting questions concerning the ultimate criteria of validity, depends
merely on the fact that, at that time, the application of those criteria to a
vast area of law, including the rules which confer that authority, raises no
doubt.. .,,4 Hart misses what is almost, and should be, his own point:
while it is true that at any one time there are vast areas free of doubt which
constitute a core of certainty, that core has been established by the very
forces that it now (but temporarily)holds in bounds. It is still the case that
what succeeds is success; it is just that one of the things success brings (for
a time) are vast areas free of doubt. What must be remembered is that
those areas rest on a foundation that is itself doubtful, i.e. subject to
challenge, and therefore are in no sense (except the local sense of their
ascendancy) determinate.
I could go on with this reading of The Concept of Law, but it would
only reveal further variations on the pattern we have repeatedly seen: a
mechanism is proposed with the claim that it will keep force-whether in
the form of the gunman or the interpreter-at bay; and in each instance
force turns out to be the content of the mechanism designed to control it.
No matter how many layers of rules, plain cases, cores of settled meanings,
precedents one puts in place, the bottom line remains the ascendancy of
one person-or of one set of interests aggressively pursued-over another,
and the dream of general rules "judicially applied" 46 remains just that, a
dream. It would seem that Richard Rorty is right when he characterizes
interpretation as an operation in which the agent- be he a judge or a
literary critic-"simply beats the text into a shape which will serve his own
purpose" and "makes the text refer to whatever is relevant to that purpose." 47
Rorty's casually brutal language names the fear in response to which
Hart and so many others mount their projects, the fear, first that nothing
stands between the exercise of power and its victims, and, second, that the
activities we engage in are finally meaningless. The point has been succinctly
put by Wayne Booth: If disagreements are settled by "the most forceful
means of persuasion," we are condemned "to a sense of ultimate futility
in what we do," and we become successively and perpetually bound "to
whichever suitor woos most winningly." '4 The alternative is, of course, to
find a stay against the workings of persuasive power, and for most of those
who have thought about the questions, that stay is some form of rationality,
whether is be a logic, a special kind of language, a determinate rule, a
monumental text, a neutral procedure. E. D. Hirsch sums up an entire
tradition (which begins at least with Plato) when he declares it is "essential
to distinguish hypotheses and evidence from the rhetoric used to convey
them. '49 It is essential because rhetoric is by definition the forceful pres-
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entation of an interested argument-rhetoric is another word for forceand what is desired is a way of neutralizing interest so that the decisions
generated by the system will not be the product of any partial or partisan
point of view.
It is just such a way that Hart seeks, but even if he were to find it (in
some rule or precedent) he would only have done half the job, for the
neutralization of interest is an interior as well as an exterior task. The
success rhetoric may have in turning the mind away from purely rational
considerations is a function as much of tendencies in the mind as it is of
pressuring forces external to the mind; an illegitimate appeal can hardly
have an effect if there is nothing to appeal to. (Remember, primary rules
are necessary because of the human susceptibility to base actions). If genuine
evidence is to be disentangled from partisan posturing, a corresponding
separation must occur in the mind, lest the genuine go unrecognized. As
part of its program to protect the individual from force, the law must also
control, by neutralizing, the forces that live within the individual, the forces
that, if left unchecked, would prompt him to the subversion of the very
rules that offer him a world of security and stability. That is why those
who, like Hart, argue for a neutral space in the world must also argue for
a neutral space in the mind, one free of biases, prejudices and presuppositions. Thus Stephen Toulmin urges us to "discount" any "biases and
prejudices" we may have to that we might act "in a disinterested way," 50
and in a similar vein, Wayne Booth advises that we "develop a habit of
great skepticism about one's own hypothesis" 5' and "[exercise] a healthy
tentativeness about oneself and one's responses." ' 52 The advice seems sound
until one thinks about acting on it. Just how does one distance oneself
from oneself? With what part of oneself can one be tentative about oneself?
The answer lies in the assumption by Toulmin and Booth of a psychological
core that is the equivalent of the cores Hart finds in determinate rules,
settled meanings, centrally clear cases, etc.; it is this core of rationality
inside us that protects us from the pressure of our own convictions and
predispositions. The danger represented by the predispositions, the danger
of surrendering to illegitimate appeals, is exactly like the danger represented
by the gunman in Hart's scenario. The only difference is that this gunman
is in our heads, but that is finally no difference at all as Terry Eagleton
makes clear when he equates being "forced mindlessly" into an action by
an "ideological obsession" with the pressure of somebody "holding a gun
to my head." ' 53 It is one thing, Eagleton adds, to be "convinced by the
arguments and evidence," and quite another to hold convictions "because
they are convenient... or fashionably eccentric." In the first case one is
50. Toulmin, The Construal of Realty, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION, 107 (W.
Mitchell ed. 1982).
51. BOOTH, supra note 48, at 225.
52. Id. at 226.
53. Eagleton, Ineluctable Opinions, in THE PoLITIcs oF INTERPRETATION 376 (W. Mitchell
ed. 1982).
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"able to weigh the arguments" and become convinced in a way that is
'freer"'; in the second one is the victim of "a spontaneous ideological
prejudice. ' ' 54 Of course, the source of that prejudice is oneself, and therefore
one is, in a curious way, self-victimized. It follows then that in order to
cease being a victim one must cease being oneself. That at least is the
implication of Eagleton's odd phrase "forced rhindlessly"; since what you
are being forced by in his scenario are the beliefs and predispositions what
now fill your mind, in order not to be so forced you would have to empty
your mind of everything it contains, so that in Wallace Stevens' words, you
would "have a mind of winter."
The problem with this strategy is simply that it is not possible to follow
it; and, moreover, even if we could somehow follow it, the condition of
being free from ideological control would be wholly disabling because there
would be nothing either to be free with or for. There would be nothing to
be free with because were every preconception, acquired belief, assumed
point of view, opinion, bias and prejudice removed from the mind, there
would be nothing left with which to calculate, determine and decide. There
is nothing to be free for, because a mind divested of all direction-a mind
not already oriented toward this or that purpose or plan or agenda-could
not recognize any reason for going in one direction rather than another or,
for that matter, for going in any direction at all. It is often claimed that
reason itself is what is left when belief, preconception and prejudice have
been set aside or discounted, but reason cannot operate independently of
some content-of some proposition or propositions whose content is definitions, distinctions, and criteria already assumed-and that content will
reflect some belief or attitude that will inform whatever outcome reason
dictates. (This is to say, once again, that the "core" is always and already
invaded by the penumbra.) I am aware that in so arguing I am asserting
the identity of two entities that are often distinguished and even opposed,
reason and belief. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the quest for a
way of quarantining the process of law from force depends on that opposition; for if one defines knowledge as that which exists independently of
any particular perspective, belief-which is another name for perspectivebecomes a bar to its achievement. In this view beliefs are the property of
partisan agendas and if one is to resist their appeal, an appeal that amounts
to nothing less than coercion, one must distance oneself from them and
neutralize their force. It is my contention that this is precisely what one
cannot possibly do, and still remain a "one," a being with a capacity for
action. In short, you can never get away from your beliefs which means
that you can never get away from force, from the pressure exerted by a
partial, nonneutral, nonauthoritative, ungrounded point of view.
We see then that the two strategies by which force is to be held in
check fail in the same way. On the other hand there is the attempt to erect
an external barrier-sometimes a determinate rule, or a plain case or a
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settled meaning-but in every ins.ance the barrier turns out to be indistinguishable from that which it would hold back; force is already inside the
gate because it is the gate. On the other hand there is the attempt to
perform an internal housecleaning, to remove from the mind the tendencies
that correspond to force's appeal; but this turns out to be at once impossible
and in a very literal sense self-defeating, since a mind so cleansed would
have nothing inside it. The ideal of a mind that is insulated from pressure
is as unattainable as the ideal of a rule that will be a stay against the assault
of interpretive desires. The mind, insofar as it is anything, is a structure of
pressures, of purposes, urgencies, interests already in place; and the rule,
insofar as it is intelligible, is an extension of some interested agenda that
cannot be kept out because it is already in. To the extent that the law is
compelling, it is compelling in relation to the very prejudices and biases it
supposedly neutralizes; the reasons for which we do something or refrain
from doing something are reasons only by virtue of the preconceptions and
predispositions we already have.
The conclusion is inescapable and it is the one I have repeatedly reached:
The force of the law is always and already indistinguishable from the forces
it would oppose. Or to put the matter another way: there is always a gun
at your head. Sometimes the gun is, in literal fact, a gun. Sometimes it is
a reason, an assertion whose weight is inseparable from some already
assumed purpose. Sometimes it is a desire, the urging of a state of affairs
to which you are already predisposed. Sometimes it is a need you already
feel. Sometimes it is a name-country, justice, honor, love, God-whose
power you have already internalized. Whatever it is, it will always be a
form of coercion, of an imperative whose source is an interest which speaks
to the interest in you. And this leads me to a second aphorism: not only
is there always a gun at your head; the gun at your head is your head; the
interests that seek to compel you are appealing and therefore pressuring
only to the extent they already live within you, and indeed are you. In the
end we are always self-compelled, coerced by forces-beliefs, convictions,
reasons, desires-from which we cannot move one inch away.
Another way to put this is to say that while there are constraints on
the will and therefore on interpretation, those constraints are internal to
the will and do not provide a point of reference independent of it. By
"internal" I mean something directly opposite to what Hart means when
he distinguishes between the internal and the external "points of view" with
respect to the imperatives of a legal system. In his analysis, one operates
from the external point of view when one notes, in the manner of an
' 55
anthropological observer, that "a social group accepts [certain] rules;
one operates from the internal point of view when one "uses" those rules
in determining one's everyday obligations. The internal agent need not, and
characteristically does not, state the rules by which he is guided; his
knowledge of them is more integral than that of the mere observer and is
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expressed in the way he applies them from moment to moment. To this I
would object that neither of these "points of view" is genuinely internal.
To be sure, they are different: in one the agent specifies the rules without
being committed to them, while in the other, the agent is committed to the
rules but does not (characteristically) specify them. Both agents, however,
are in the same relation of distance to the rules in the sense that they could
be held at arms length and examined; it is just that for one the examination
or nothing of the rules is the end point of the activity; while the other goes
on to use or apply them. The very words "use" and "apply" make my
point, that the rules in Hart's picture are separate from a self that is free
to employ them or not. The words "use" and "apply" signify instrumentality in relation to an independent actor; but what I have been arguing is
that the actor is never is such a relation and that the imperatives to which
he responds cannot be held at arm's length-cannot, in Eagleton's terms,
be "weighed"-because they are constitutive of the actor's every gesture,
including the gesture of weighing.
This is the only internal perspective worth the name (and indeed the
only perspective there is: even the "external" observer does his observing
from a vantage point he could not observe because it grounds him; his
conclusions are no less internal than the conclusions of a community
member) and it is the perspective Hart cannot endorse or even acknowledge
because it leaves no room for a "core" or "center" to which the agent's
prejudices and desires can be referred for judgment. It is in relation to that
core and to the possibility of disinterestedly identifying it that Hart imagines
a superior group of citizens who, unlike their less reflective fellows, do not
obey the laws out of fear or habit, but "appraise" them "critically ' 56 and
obey them in a more self-consciously rational way. It is this self-consciousness that marks the Hartian internal point of view which is in fact the point
of view achieved when the agent has purged himself of whatever is inside
him in favor of a standard he prefers to his own. That is to say, Hart's
internal point of view is an external point of view in disguise and, moreover,
as I have repeatedly demonstrated, it is one that cannot be occupied.
In so saying I may seem to confirm Hart's fear of a world without
order or principle, wholly given over to force in the form either of gunmen
or of judges unconstrained in their actions or of wills unchecked by any
core of rationality. But in fact the implication of my argument is that this
fear is unrealizable and is based on an incorrect understanding of what
force is and is not. What force is not is "mere" force, force unconnected
with any agenda or program. Force is simply a (pejorative) name for the
thrust or assertion of some point of view, and in a world where the urging
of points of view cannot be referred for adjudication to some independent
tribunal, force is just another name for what follows naturally from conviction. That is to say, force wears the aspect of anarchy only if one regards
it as an empty blind urge, but if one identifies it as interest aggressively
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pursued, force acquires a content and that content is a complex of goals
and purposes, underwritten by a vision, and put into operation by a detailed
agenda complete with steps, stages, and directions. Force, in short, is already
a repository of everything it supposedly threatens-norms, standards, reasons, and yes, even rules. One could, of course, object (or complain) that
such rules, standards and reasons are merely local and partisan and provide
no mechanism for principled adjudication. But this would be to reinvoke
the dream of a principle that was neutral- of a rule of recognition, or a
centrally plain case or a core of settled meaning-and in response I could
only offer once again the analyses of the preceding pages in which that
neutrality is shown to be unavailable, both in its material and psychological
forms. What I am trying to show now is that this state of affairs is in no
way disastrous or even disabling; it appears to be disabling only if the
alternative to neutrality is principled force-and it is my argument that
there is no other kind-then the unavailability of neutrality simply does not
have and could not have the consequences Hart fears. The absence of
external or independent constraints only means that the constraints inherent
in the condition of belief-the condition of having been persuaded to some
vision, the condition of not seeking, but already occupying a position-are
always and inescapably in force. The facts that you can never move one
inch away from your beliefs means too that you can never move one inch
away from norms and principles.
To be sure, this does not solve our practical problems, since we still
are faced with the difficulty of adjudicating between beliefs in the absence
of a calculus that is not itself a function or extension of belief. It is a
difficulty that cannot be removed, but the fact that it cannot be removed
does not condemn us to uncertainty and paralysis, but to conflict, to acts
of persuasion in which one party attempts to alter the beliefs of another
by putting forward arguments that are weighty only in relation to still other
beliefs. By definition the career of persuasion is unpredictable and theoretically interminable; there is no guarantee that either party will be victorious
although in some social structures-and the law is certainly one of themvictory is mandated in the form of the obligation to render a decision. But
when victory occurs, whether by the surrender of one party to the party of
which he now becomes a member or by jurisdictional fiat, it is always
provisional; for since it has emerged from argument, from forceful urging
of some partisan point of view, it is always provisional; for since it has
emerged from argument, from forceful urging of some partisan point of
view, it is always possible, and indeed likely, that what has apparently been
settled will become unsettled, and argument will begin again.
Once again we reach a conclusion that seems to realize one of Hart's
worst fears, in this case the fear of a legal (?) structure marked by the
"mere temporary ascendancy of one person over another.' ' sT The burden
of Hart's complaint falls on "temporary," for which we might substitute,
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occasional, local, transitory, ad hoc, etc. It is not difficult to see why words
like these are distressing; they run contrary to the assumption, so powerful
in our legal culture, that what courts and judges do is extend into the
present abiding principles of law and morality. This is the content, for
example, of Ronald Dworkin's notion of "law as integrity" and of his
distinction between principle and policy. 5s There are all kinds of good
reasons why that assumption continues to inform the story the law tells
about itself even as its history enacts quite another story. After all, the law
could hardly advertise itself as resting on force (given that word's bad press)
and still be accepted as law. Hart is right when he insists that it is the very
essence of law to distinguish itself from force; and, moreover, that distinction is real insofar as it refers to a society's understanding of its foundational
moorings in relation to the energies that would threaten to dissolve them.
My point is that such an understanding, necessary as it is to the constitution
of any society or community, is itself an artifact of time, a "mere temporary
ascendancy" of one vision or agenda over its rivals, and that when that
temporary ascendancy has been succeeded by another, the distinction between law and force will still be in force, but the content and distribution
of its terms will be different. It is that succession of differences that makes
up the law's history, a history that includes a claim of continuity that is
belied by its own events.
Are legal actors then living out a lie, asserting as absolute what they
should acknowledge as fragile and transitory? Not at all. Legal actors, like
everyone else, live within the temporary ascendancies they at once affirm
and undo (by endlessly modifying the givens that make action possible) and
no analysis of their situation, even the analysis offered here, will remove
them from it. That is to say, the acknowledgment that from the long run
point of view law is inseparable from force is itself without force, since no
one inhabits the long run point of view, and in the succession of short runs
that make up our lives, the distinction between law and force is unassailable,
although one can always assail the form it has presently assumed.
I say this to ward off a conclusion often reached on the left: That a
recognition of the temporally contingent nature of our "fundamental"
assumptions would lessen their force and make us less likely to surrender
to them. But the conclusion is possible only if one makes the mistake
(which I have called "antifoundationalist theory hope") of turning the
recognition of contingency into a way of avoiding contingency, as if
contingency acknowledged were contingency transcended. You may know
in general that the structure of your convictions is an historical artifact but
that knowledge does not transport you to a place where those convictions
are no longer in force. We remain embedded in history even when we know
that it is history we are embedded in, and while that knowledge may be
satisfying in relation to alternative stories about our convictions (for example
that they correspond or should correspond to the unchanging nature of
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things), in relation to the particular convictions (including itself) by which
we are not grasped and constituted, it is of no force whatsoever. s9
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